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procurement costs. This raises potential policy questions of whether and how entry
should be encouraged or limited in public procurement auctions. We use evidence
from auctions of construction contracts to estimate the effect of an increase in the
pool of potential bidders on entry and auction prices when entry and bidding deci-
sions are made sequentially with no knowledge of the number or identity of the actual
competitors.
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1 Introduction
In many government procurement auctions bidders must prepare their bids at a cost
and in ignorance of the actual competition that they face. We provide a characterization
of optimal bidding in a model that has both the common and the private values auc-
tions as polar cases under the assumption that the number of bidders is endogenously
determined. The known number of plan holders (i.e., the set of potential bidders) trade
off the likely auction payoffs from participating with the bid preparation costs incurred
in the process of bidding.
We assume that bid preparation costs are incurred in the process of the bidders’
value determinations, so that the entry decision is made prior to determining a partic-
ular bid. This essentially yields a sequential decision process for the bidders—first,
whether or not to enter, and second, how high to bid upon entry. We examine how these
decisions are affected by both the nature of the project (private vs. common value)
and the number of potential bidders. This two-step procedure generates theoretical
considerations that we examine with actual data from procurement auctions.
The problem of endogenous entry in the presence of an unknown number of ri-
vals has been studied elsewhere in the literature. Harstad (1990) considers a common
value auction, whereas Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987), Deltas and Jeitschko (2007),
and Moreno and Wooders (2008) consider the independent private values (IPV) set-
ting. Levin and Smith (1994) study a general framework and assume a stochastic
number of bidders at the entry stage. Bidders learn the number of competitors prior
to bidding. Menezes and Monteiro (2000) assume that the bidders learn their values
before they incur the bid preparation cost. Marmer et al. (2007) consider a model
within the IPV setting in which bidders receive information at the entry stage that
is imperfectly correlated with their valuations; they pay a bid preparation cost to
learn the actual private cost of the contract and bid without knowing the number of
competitors.
Li and Zheng (2008) is most closely related to our work, as they have the same
informational assumptions as we do; however, they restrict attention to the IPV model.
Indeed, our main results for the polar case of private values is analogous to their
findings, even though there is some variation in the modeling assumption even for
the private values case. Moreover, our framework incorporates a range of different
assumptions on bidders’ valuations and allows us to provide a comparison across
cases.
Using road construction auction data from the Texas Department of Transportation
(TxDOT), we examine a two-step process of ‘entry’ and ‘bidding’ for plan holders
in independent private value and common value auctions. We show that an increase
in the number of potential competitors has a more significant effect in independent
private value auctions compared to auctions with large common value components.
Whereas the number of potential bidders has an effect on the probability to submit a
bid, most of the effect of the number of potential bidders on the bid levels is through
the competitive effect. The entry decision may have less to do with the number of
competitors and more with project characteristics and potential synergies between
projects that are being auctioned off.
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The model and the main theoretical findings of interest are presented in Sect. 2.
A description of the data set used is given in Sect. 3 followed by the empirical anal-
ysis in Sect. 4. We conclude with policy implications and possible concerns for the
organization of procurement auctions in Sect. 5.
2 Model
Consider the set of potential bidders for construction projects auctioned off by the
government. These are the firms that are pre-approved by the contracting agency
for bidding in procurement auctions. Periodically, the government has projects to
be completed that are allocated by means of procurement auctions. In a first step,
the agency draws up plans that give the specifics of a project. While the general
class of the project is known to bidders (e.g., road resurfacing, bridge work, etc.),
the specifics are discovered only by obtaining the plans. Regularly, not all pre-
approved firms secure a copy of these plans. We denote the group that do by N , with
N = {1, . . . , N }, and refer to them as the plan holders. Assume that N is determined
exogenously.
Upon obtaining a plan for project j , a plan holder determines (observes) his indi-
vidual bid-preparation (drafting) cost, di j , which are distributed i.i.d. according to the
strictly increasing function Fd j on [0,∞). On the basis of the bid preparation cost
a bidder decides whether or not to become active and enter a bid in the auction. We
denote by A ⊆ N the number of active bidders, with A = {1, . . . , A}.
While the number of plan holders N is known to all bidders, the number of bid-
ders, A, is not so that bids are prepared under “number uncertainty.” However, the
equilibrium is derived by first determining the optimal strategy when the number of
rivals is known (i.e., for given A) and then the optimal strategies for the case of number
uncertainty (known N , but unknown A) are compiled from the strategies with a known
number of rival bidders. We therefore proceed under the assumption that a bidder’s
number of rivals, A − 1 is known to the bidder and first determine the equilibrium
bid strategies under this assumption—thereafter dropping this assumption in order to
derive the equilibrium for the model in which bidders are uncertain about the number
of rivals that they face at the bidding stage.
In the process of preparing a bid, bidders obtain information on their costs for
completing the project. The costs of completing a project are a composite of private
cost characteristics (e.g., one’s own capacity utilization, equipment) and common cost
elements (e.g., costs of materials, or costs of subcontracting). Specifically, let a firm’s
costs be γ ci j + (1 − γ )K j , where γ ci j denotes the firm’s private cost component,
(1 − γ )K j denotes the cost component that is common to all firms, and γ ∈ [0, 1]
denotes the weight of private and common cost components in the overall cost to the
firm.
Bidders’ private cost components are derived from i.i.d. draws ci j from the log-
concave distribution Fc j on
[
c j , c j
]
. Bidders observe their own private cost compo-
nents and know the distribution Fc j . Bidders also observe a signal on the common
cost component. Specifically, each bidder privately observes an i.i.d. draw ki j from
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the commonly known log-concave distribution Fk j on
[
k j , k j
]
. The common cost
component then results from K j = 1A
∑
i ki j , where A is the number of (active)
bidders.1
The auction format is a standard lowest-price closed-bid procurement auction in
which bids above the highest possible cost are rejected. Letting E denote the expecta-
tions operator for the common cost component, a bidder who wins a contract with bid
bi j has an expected (continuation) payoff (gross of bid preparation costs) of bi j −γ ci j −
E
[
(1 − γ )K j
] = bi j −γ ci j −(1−γ ) 1A E
[∑
m∈A kmj
] = bi j −si j −(1−γ ) A−1A Ek j ;
where si j := γ ci j + (1 − γ ) 1A ki j denotes a bidder’s “type” for a given number of
rivals A.
Notice first that a bidder’s payoff is strictly monotone in his type si j . Second,
since fc j (x) and fk j (x) are log-concave, so are f˜c j (x) := fc j (γ x) and f˜k j (x) :=
fk j ((1−γ )x/A). Moreover, since c j and k j are independent, the convolution of their
distributions is also log-concave. Thus, the distribution of types for a given A denoted
by Fs Aj on
[






γ c j + (1 − γ ) 1A k j , γ c j + (1 − γ ) 1A k j
]
, is log-concave. In
sum, the bidders’ two dimensional signals on costs can be aggregated into the one-
dimensional type s which is assured to be monotone in bidders’ values of winning the
contract and of which the distribution is log-concave. Hence, the standard methodol-
ogy for deriving the equilibrium bid function in IPV auctions for a known number of
rivals can be used. That is, bidders place bids that exceed their expected costs by the
expected cost difference to the next-lowest-cost bidder, assuming that they themselves
have the lowest overall costs.
Formally, the symmetric equilibrium bidding function for a first-(i.e., lowest-)price
sealed-bid auction when the number of rivals (A − 1) is known is given by:
B j (s|A) = E
[
γ ci j + (1 − γ )K j
∣∣∣∣si j = min
m∈A









∣∣∣∣si j = min
m∈A
smj = s; A
]
,
with bids restricted to be below γ c j + (1 − γ )k j .
The first term in the bid function is the agent’s expected cost of completing
the project, assuming that he has the lowest cost and assuming that there are A rivals.
The second term in the bid function gives the amount by which bids are increased
above cost estimates, which is the expected difference in costs between the bidder and
the next lowest-cost bidder, given the same conditioning.
Having established the bidding procedure when the number of rivals is known, one
can consider the problem faced by a bidder with an unknown number of rivals. A
critical result established in Goeree and Offerman (2003) (i.e., Proposition 4) is that
the particular aggregation of each bidders’ two signals into one-dimensional types
not only allows for the derivation of the equilibrium in the lowest price auction using
1 This set-up is very similar to Goeree and Offerman (2003) which serves as a basis for the subsequent
derivation of the equilibrium bid function with a known number of rivals.
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standard methodology, but also results in revenue (and hence payoff) equivalence
across auction formats. This is convenient, since Krishna (2002) demonstrates how
payoff equivalence is used to derive the optimal bidding strategies for the auction with
an uncertain number of rivals as a compilation of the strategies used for the underly-
ing cases with known numbers of rivals (Krishna 2002, pp. 35–36). Specifically, the
equilibrium bid function is a weighted average of the bid functions used with different
(known) numbers of rivals. To this end, define
p(A|N ) = Pr{A active bidders, given N plan holders},
and let
(
1 − Fs Aj (y)
)(A−1) = Pr{smallest of A − 1 draws from Fs Aj is greater than y},
with
(
1 − Fs Aj (y)
)(0) = 1. Then the symmetric equilibrium bidding function for the
first (i.e., lowest) price auction with N plan holders and unknown number of active
bidders A is given by
B j (s|N ) =
N∑
A=1
p(A|N )(1 − Fs Aj (s))
(A−1)
∑N
A=1 p(A|N )(1 − Fs Aj (s))(A−1)
B j (s|A).
In order to complete the analysis, the equilibrium probabilities of entry, p(A|N ),
remain to be determined. Individual bidders are willing to incur their bid-preparation
costs of di j provided that their expected earnings in the auction are sufficient to cover
these costs. The expected earnings of the winner of the auction is the difference in
cost-types between the lowest and second-lowest types when there are A active bid-
ders. Clearly a bidder’s ex ante expectation of this is subject to the number of bidders
who enter the auction. Moreover, since bidders make the entry decision prior to know-
ing their type si j , the expected payoff of entering is the same for all plan holders,
although their bid preparation costs are not. Thus, letting S j(l:A) denote the lth (lowest)
order statistic from A draws from Fs Aj (with S
j
(l:A) := s j whenever l > A), a bidder’s
expected payoff from participating in an auction with A bidders, before knowing his
type is
πi j |A =
E
[




and given the different probabilities of numbers of (active) bidders, the ex ante expected
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Since bidders’ bid preparation costs, di j , are distributed according to the function
Fd j on [0,∞), for arbitrary cutoff x , the probability that a bidder faces exactly A − 1
of N − 1 rival plan holders that have bid preparation costs below x is given by






A−1 (1 − Fd j (x)
)N−A
. (2)
In equilibrium, all bidders with bid preparation costs lower than the expected auction
payoff enter the auction. Thus, the threshold bid-preparation cost, d∗i j , that determines
the bidder who is exactly indifferent between staying out of the auction and entering





















Taking the above results together, one obtains the joint conditions for the unique
symmetric equilibrium entry and bidding strategies:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Entry and Bidding) In the unique symmetric equilibrium,
bidders with bid preparation costs below d∗i j enter the auction and upon observing
their cost signals ci j and ki j bid according to the function






∣∣∣d∗i j , N
) (








∣∣∣d∗i j , N
) (






γ ci j + (1 − γ )K j + min
l
s Al j − minl =i s
A
l j





where s Ai j = γ ci j + (1 − γ )ki j/A; and d∗i j is implicitly given by Eq. 3.
Proof The construction of the equilibrium follows from the above derivations. Unique-
ness of the entry threshold follows from the fact that both sides of Eq. 3 are continuous
in di j , and the left-hand-side is increasing, whereas the right-hand-side is decreasing.
To see the latter, note that the bidder’s expected payoff as a function of the number of
active bidders (Eq. 1) is strictly decreasing in A. This is the second term in the product
on the right-hand-side of Eq. 3. The first term in the product on the right-hand-side of
Eq. 3 is the distribution of the number of active bidders given by Eq. 2. An increase
in di j strictly increases Fd j
(
di j
) (since Fd j is strictly increasing), which induces a
first-order-stochastic-dominance shift in the distribution of bidders (see, Wolfstetter
1999, Lemma 8.3, p. 223), hence increasing the probability of obtaining a lower payoff
due to greater participation.2 unionsq
2 It is noteworthy that although Moreno and Wooders (2008) consider only private values auctions, the
proof of uniqueness of their symmetric equilibrium applies here as well, since our framework maps into
the general pay-off structure used in the proofs there.
123
Entry and Bidding in Common and Private Value Auctions 79
We now consider the bidding and entry equilibrium for independent private values
and common values separately. Our main concern is how the number of plan holders
affects the bidding behavior in the auction.












where, following Li and Zheng (2008), we refer to the first part as the “competi-
tion effect,” which captures the effect of increased (potential) competition on bidding
behavior, for given entry probabilities, and we refer to the second effect as the “entry
effect,” which captures that incurring the expense of bid preparations becomes less
attractive the smaller is the expected payoff from participating in the auction.
Lemma 1 (Competition Effect) The partial effect of the number of plan holders on




whereas in the pure common values setting it depends on the distribution and need
not be monotone.
Proof Recall that the bid function is a weighted average of the bid functions that
are used when the number of rivals is known, as given above. Notice that in the private
values framework (i.e., γ = 1) bids in these latter functions are decreasing in A. Since
an increase in N leads to an increase in the expected number of bidders A in the sense
of first-order stochastic dominance (also Wolfstetter 1999, Lemma 8.3, p. 223), the
result follows. The fact that the sign depends on the distributional assumptions and
may not be monotone for the case of common values is well known for the bidding
functions with known rivals (see, e.g., Wilson 1992), and carries over to this setting
as well. unionsq
The latter part of the Lemma draws an apparent clear contrast between private and
common value auctions. Moreover, Wilson’s (1992) work on normal and lognormal
distributions suggests that bids are decreasing in the number of plan holders for a small
N , but become increasing for larger N .
As for the entry effect, ambiguity persists for the case of common value auctions,
but not for private value auctions. Formally,
Lemma 2 (Entry Effect) The partial effect of endogenous entry on bidding is positive








whereas in the pure common values setting it is ambiguous.
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Proof For both cases—private and common values—the implicit partial derivative of
Eq. 3 with respect to entry can be shown to be negative,
∂d∗i j
∂N < 0, since expected
payoffs are decreasing in bidder participation (see, e.g., Deltas and Jeitschko 2007).




, the proof of Lemma 1 follows mutatis mutandis, since—
as referenced in the proof to Proposition 1—p increases in the sense of first order
stochastic dominance also for the case of changes in A. unionsq
The theoretical results in Lemmata 1 and 2 suggest that the effects of potential entry are
sensitive to and may differ substantially between private and common cost projects. In
the private cost setting the effects are unambiguous, but operate in opposite directions,
whereas in the common cost case, the competitive effect is non-monotonic and the
entry effect can be ambiguous. As a result, the decision to encourage or discourage
entry may be based on close consideration of the characteristics of the projects auc-




We utilize data from the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) to examine
bidding behavior under the assumption that the number of bidders is endogenously
determined. The data used in this study comprise information on asphalt and bridge
construction projects auctioned by TxDOT from August 1998 to August 2007. Pro-
jects are auctioned each month, in a first-price sealed-bid format wherein the lowest
bidder is awarded the contract. For each project, there is information on the plan hold-
ers (contractors that hold plans), the bids submitted by each firm if it bid, the winning
bid, and the winning firm.
It is important to note that before a bidder may submit a bid on a construction
or maintenance project, the Department of Transportation requires that the bidder be
qualified.3 The list of plan holders identifies the potential prequalified competitors for
a given project. The plan holder list is updated daily and is public information and
available to all bidders prior to the auction letting. The plans are obtained free of charge
from the TxDOT. These give the location, a detailed description of the tasks that can
relay complexity, the estimated time to completion and, most importantly, the detailed
engineering cost estimate (ECE) for each project component. At this stage, potential
competitors might learn about specialized input required in the process that can affect
the level of bids or the number of actual bidders. We view N as an exogenous variable.
3 Pre-qualification involves bidders’ submission of certified financial statements to the TxDOT and is
related to the level of working capital available to the potential bidder as well as its history of successful
completion of projects. The resultant evaluation is used to determine the size of projects that a firm can bid
on. Firms can be disqualified and ‘black listed’ at any time if they fail to complete contracts successfully.
More information about pre-qualification can be obtained at http://www.dot.state.tx.us/business.
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Each project has many bid components. These bid components are classified in
categories identified by the 2004 TxDOT Standard Specifications (TSS).4 We sum
the total dollar value of the bid components in each category and calculate its share
as a ratio of ECE. Suppose that for a given project the highest share belongs to the
asphalt component category. In this case, we identify that project as an asphalt project.
A similar method is used in categorizing bridge work.
The data set is a panel data set where an observation is a firm that held a plan and
possibly submitted a bid for a given project. Note that, firms may place multiple bids
for multiple projects in a month or may not bid at all, and therefore, the panel structure
is unbalanced.
We discuss the details of variable construction below. In this study, we utilize the
bidding data of firms that participated in auctions held from August 1998 to December
1999 to create bidding and capacity utilization histories. Note that, in the regression
analysis we use data from January 2000 to August 2007. Our interest is to study
bidding behavior separately in those auctions that have predominantly common and
private cost components when the participation decision is endogenous. As in Hong
and Shum (2002) and De Silva et al. (2008), we categorize asphalt projects as inde-
pendent private value auctions and bridge work as projects with large common value
components. The reason is that asphalt projects are generally straightforward, requir-
ing a contractor to lay down asphalt across a specific road surface to a certain thickness.
Compared to asphalt, the costs associated with bridge work are often more uncertain.
Note that, as each bridge is different, bridge construction projects, will differ in com-
plexity. In our analysis of bridge projects, we use only auctions with at least 50% share
on bridge work. We also restrict attention to asphalt maintenance projects with at least
50% asphalt share and bridge, earth and subgrade components less than 5% to limit
uncertainty in the performance of a task.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the data set. Due to the volume of auc-
tions, TxDOT conducts two sessions of bid letting within each month, typically taking
place on two consecutive days. We present statistics for the second session separately.
When considering asphalt projects, we observe that there were 1,216 awarded auc-
tions with on average a little over six plan holders per auction and fewer than four
bidders per auction.5 The average relative bid for asphalt projects was 1.008 and the
average relative winning bid was .938. Also, we observe that the average number of
bid items was about 33 and the average asphalt-related work share compared to the
ECE was .786.
When considering bridge work projects we observe that there were 1,112 awarded
auctions with an average number of plan holders between eight and nine, yielding just
about five bids per auction. The average relative bid for bridge projects was 1.163 and
the average relative winning bid was 1.015. The average number of bid items was about
62 for bridge projects and the bridge related work share compared to ECE was .657.
In the sample of second sessions, the values are similar to the full sample values.
4 TxDOT Specifications. http://www.dot.state.tx.us/business/specifications.htm.
5 In this auction setting there is no explicit reserve price. Generally, however, the ECE is a basis for rejection
of a project. Based on this the state may reject bids as unbalanced but the data reveal that only eight out
1,224 asphalt auctions and five out of 1,117 bridge projects were rejected in the sample of analysis.
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Table 1 Summary statistics
Variables Asphalt projects Bridge projects
Full sample Second session Full sample Second session
Number of auctions 1,224 603 1,117 505
Number of awarded auctions 1,216 600 1,112 503
Average number of plan holders 6.077 (2.547) 6.212 (2.591) 8.646 (3.507) 8.431 (3.376)
Average number of bidders 3.745 (1.736) 3.733 (1.758) 5.151 (2.211) 4.932 (1.952)
Average relative bid 1.008 (.175) 1.004 (.178) 1.163 (.282) 1.160 (.253)
Average relative winning bid .938 (.150) .939 (.156) 1.015 (.242) 1.017 (.199)
Average engineering
estimatea
$3.163 (3.040) $3.289 (2.866) $4.057 (15.600) $3.250 (9.851)
Asphalt work bid items share .786 (.079) .786 (.079) .039 (.051) .043 (.053)
Bridge work bid items share .004 (.010) .005 (.011) .657 (.097) .649 (.095)
Average number of bid
components in a project
33.143 (19.456) 33.252 (18.238) 62.150 (68.660) 62.023 (57.152)
a In millions of dollars. Standard deviations are in parentheses
3.2 Variable Definitions
In our analysis we use a bid dummy to summarize bidder participation patterns and
the log of bids to summarize bidding patterns. The independent variables can be clas-
sified into four main groups; namely, auction characteristics, bidder characteristics,
rival characteristics, and business environment characteristics. Construction of these
variables is given in Table 5 in the Appendix. There are 13 auction-level variables—the
number of plan holders, expected number of bidders, ECE, seven project share vari-
ables, and the number of bid items. The number of plan holders and expected number
of bidders control for differences in competition in auctions and the project type shares
control for the fact that we observe differences in bidding across project categories.
The engineering cost estimates are constructed by the state by pricing each bid item
outlined in the design and then deriving an overall cost estimate for the project. The
engineering cost estimate is used to control for project-specific differences in cost.
We also use the number of bid items in a project to control for the complexity of the
project and the number of days to complete the project.
With respect to bidders’ own characteristics, in addition to firm fixed effects, five
measures are used to control for bidder cost heterogeneities. We use a dummy variable
to identify when a bidder is bidding in the same county where the firm has an ongoing
project to identify the potential for synergies. A past winner with an ongoing project in
a specific county may be able to extract cost complementarities by bidding in similar
projects in the same county. A similar approach has been used by De Silva (2005).
We use a firm’s difference between its current capacity utilization rate and its average
capacity utilization rate to explore excessive commitment in capacity. We also use the
distance to a project.
As mentioned earlier, all auctions taking place in a month are offered in two sessions.
Bids are placed separately on each contract and all bids submitted within a session are
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opened simultaneously. Synergies may play an important role in these auctions, and
there is evidence of bidding variation in the second session of a month due to a win or
loss in the first session. Therefore, we use the dummy variables “bidders with potential
synergies” and “bidders with no potential synergies” to capture first session winners
and losers. Note that at the entry stage bidders use all past information and the entry
decision is made for all upcoming auctions at the same time. When an entry decision
is made, the bidder does not know the outcome of the auctions in the first upcoming
session but knows the outcome of auctions from previous months. Therefore, we have
used these synergy variables only in the bidding equation as in De Silva et al. (2002)
and use only second day auctions in order to exploit the difference in information
available at the entry and bidding stages and identify appropriately the entry equation.
When considering rivals’ characteristics we construct four variables: First, we uti-
lize past information on rivals’ bidding and construct the average bidding percentage
of all rival plan holders in an auction. Also, we construct another variable: the average
winning percentage of all rival plan holders in an auction using past histories. These
variables measure rivals’ toughness. If firms face a set of tough rivals, we expect them
to bid more aggressively. Next, we include the rivals’ minimum distance to the project
and the minimum backlog of rivals. These variables are also used to control for rival
cost heterogeneity and are similar to variables used by Bajari and Ye (2003).6
Finally, other than the ECE information, it is important to control for factors that
change over time. Hence, we use three variables that control for the business envi-
ronment. These are: (1) the monthly unemployment rate, (2) the monthly variation in
the amount of projects being let, and (3) the monthly building permits. The variable
on monthly variation in the amount of projects being let measures the real volume of
projects auctioned off each month. The aggregate real volume of projects auctioned
off in a month varies across seasons. This may affect bidding behavior of firms as
the relative real volume of projects being let changes. Summary statistics of all the
regression variables are presented in Table 2.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we examine bidding behavior under the assumption that the number
of bidders is endogenously determined as (the known number of) plan holders decide
on entry based on a comparison of the expected payoffs from participation at the auc-
tion and the bid preparation costs incurred prior to bidding. This essentially yields a
sequential decision process for the bidders—first they decide whether to enter, and
then how low to bid upon entry. We investigate empirically differences in the entry
and bidding behavior across different types of auctions and focus on the impact of the
exogenous number of plan holders upon a bid consisting of a direct and an indirect
effect through the number of actual participants. At the same time, we use variables that
identify potential synergies across projects and include workload, distance effects, and
rival history. This two-step empirical procedure is used to shed light on the theoretical
results in Sect. 2.
6 See also Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) and De Silva et al. (2008, 2009, 2003, 2005).
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Table 2 Summary statistics of regression variables
Variables Asphalt projects Bridge projects
Mean SD Mean SD
Probability of submitting a
bid
.616 (.486) .596 (.491)
Log of bids 14.511 (.971) 13.800 (1.345)
Log number of plan holders 2.046 (.339) 2.346 (.346)
Log number of bidders 1.593 (.358) 1.847 (.362)
Log expected number of
bidders
1.621 (.287) 1.857 (.316)
Log of ECE 14.551 (1.009) 13.647 (1.427)
Asphalt work share of ECE .784 (.083) .037 (.050)
Bridge workshare of ECE .004 (.010) .659 (.099)
Earth work share of ECE .004 (.014) .073 (.055)
Maintenance and
miscellaneous share of ECE
.001 (.012) .0027 (.017)
Subgrade share of ECE .002 (.007) .0252 (.030)
Traffic share of ECE .094 (.073) .015 (.026)
Log of number of bid
components
3.366 (.594) 3.772 (.788)
Log of number of days to
complete the project




−.000 (.196) .000 (.217)
Log of distance to project 4.498 (1.180) 4.273 (1.084)
Bidders with ongoing projects
in the same project county
.200 (.400) .173 (.378)
Bidder with potential
synergies
.137 (.390) .083 (.276)
Bidder with no potential
synergies
.187 (.104) .158 (.364)
Rival’s past bidding to plan
holder ratio
.610 (.104) .573 (.111)
Rival’s past winning to plan
holder ratio
.157 (.058) .123 (.036)
Log of rival’s minimum
distance to the project
location
3.486 (1.045) 3.059 (1.005)
Log of rival’s minimum
backlog
6.167 (6.939) 4.984 (6.099)
Seasonally unadjusted
unemployment rate
5.443 (.869) 5.423 (.883)
Three month average of the
real volume of projects
.979 (.277) 1.042 (.308)
Three month average of the
number of building permits
.994 (.190) 1.041 (.188)
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Li and Zheng (2008) consider entry and competitive effects in a set of first-price
auctions of mowing contracts procured by the state of Texas. Their theory examines
entry and competitive effects in a private value framework. They employ a semi-para-
metric Bayesian method to estimate a structural model. Their choice of method calls
for the use of a smaller set of contracts that are less complex. There is no use of
capacity utilization, synergies, and rival history.
In our empirical analysis, first we want to test if there is an inverse relationship
between the entry probability q and the number of potential bidders N to establish an
implicit link of the bidding function to the number of potential bidders through the
entry decision.
We consider a model estimated in two stages: In the first stage, entry probabilities
are estimated using a probit model. The basic structure of the entry decision model is
as follows:
Pr(h = 1|z) = (z′ς). (7)
The variable h is the bid dummy that takes on two values: the value 1 when a bidder
submits a bid and 0 when they are only plan holders. The zs are all entry cost vari-
ables, which are: number of plan holders, ECE, number of project components, days
to complete the project, a dummy variable identifying large firms, capacity utilization,
distance to the project, bidding in a county with ongoing projects, rivals’ past bidding
to plan holder ratio, unemployment rate, volume of projects, and number of building
permits. All regressions include a constant term, 11 monthly and seven annual dummy
variables. In the full sample, we have included five project component share variables.
In the second stage, the basic structure of the equilibrium bid model is as follows:
yiat = φi + x ′iatβ + εiat , (8)
where the unit of observation is firm i bidding in auction a at time t and yiat is that
firm’s bid. All models include bidder fixed effects (φi ) as well as a set of controls
(xiat ) for bidder, rival, auction, and business conditions variables. The two specifica-
tions differ in a number of variables. The entry stage incorporates general information
on projects and rivals while the bidding stage incorporates more detailed information
available at the time of bidding. For example, at the entry stage we consider if the
project is in a county where the firm has another ongoing project while at the bidding
stage we consider the bidder’s potential to gain from synergies based on recent wins or
losses and specific starting dates of complementary projects. Some of that information
is not available to the firms at the entry stage.7 Better local knowledge about available
resources and familiarity with topography play a major factor in the entry decision.
Potential synergies in addition can create an advantage to a firm at the bidding stage.
7 As an example, take the fact that the State has two auctions sessions within a given month, taking place on
two consecutive days. The winner and the losers of an early auction may bid differently in a later auction,
based on potential synergies.
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Table 3 presents the entry decision using probit analysis. The first column is for
asphalt projects and the second for bridge work projects. Since firms are observed
repeatedly, the observations may not be independent. In this case standard errors can
be underestimated8. Therefore, we report standard errors that are clustered by firms.
It is clear from the probit results that there is an inverse relationship between the entry
probability and the number of bidders. We observe that as the number of potential
bidders or plan holders increases the probability of submitting a bid decreases both
under private or common value uncertainty. This is part of the ‘entry effect’ iden-
tified in the theoretical section. It is also evident from the results that the potential
for synergies and the size of a firm are key factors in making entry decisions. As the
distance between project and firm location increases the probability of entering the
auction decreases. However, if a bidder has an ongoing project in the same county,
then the probability of participation increases implying the potential for synergies.
The number of bid components affects the probability of submitting a bid in particular
when considering asphalt projects. The number of bid components has a direct effect
on the bid preparation cost which should be higher for more complex projects.
The estimates of the second stage bidding model are reported in the first part of
Table 4 and discussed later in comparison with other alternative specifications. We
estimate the bidding functions using the expected number of bidders from two dif-
ferent specifications in an attempt to capture the overall effect of the number of plan
holders on the bid that include entry and competitive effects. Columns (1) and (3) use
predicted number of bidders from the probit equation. Columns (2) and (4) use esti-
mates from the expected number of bidders that are calculated using past histories.9
In the second stage, we use only the second-day auctions. Specifically, first session
winners may adjust their bids in order to extract potential synergies, and similarly los-
ers may bid aggressively to recover early losses. This information was not available
at the entry stage.10
Our main interest is the in the coefficient of the log of the expected number of bid-
ders. As can be seen in private value auctions (asphalt projects) the expected number
of bidders has a negative effect on the bid level and in common value auctions (bridge
work) its effect is ambiguous and insignificant. As theory predicts, in common value
auctions, bidders make upward adjustments and we expect this to be smaller or even
positive for large expected number of bidders due to the winner’s curse effect. In the
second stage, we use a firm level fixed effect regression controlling for firm specific
8 See Moulton (1990) for more details.
9 For each plan holder at at each point in time, we construct the ratio of their past number of bids to past
number of plans held. This gives a probability of bidding for each plan holder. Therefore, for a given auction
at a given time, we sum across these participation probabilities for all plan holders in an auction. This gives
us our measure of the expected number of bidders. Since the identity of the plan holders is known to all
potential bidders, an estimate of the expected number of bidders can be constructed by firms in such a way
prior to the bid submission. This measure is similar to that used by Hendricks et al. (2003) and De Silva
et al. (2008).
10 The two-stage analysis, using probit to determine entry, assumes that a bidder who incurs the bid prep-
aration cost will not withdraw a bid in the event that his firm did not win a complementary project on the
first day of bidding. A firm would rather adjust its bid to reflect this lack of synergy, an assumption that is
not unreasonable. The cost to prepare a bid is typically 2–3% of the cost of the project to a bidder. On many
occasions, bidders make last-minute adjustments in light of new information.
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Table 3 Probit regression
results for probability
of bidding
All regressions include a
constant term and 11 monthly
dummy variables and 7 year
dummies. In the full sample we
have included seven project
component share variables.
Robust standard errors are in
parentheses (clustered by firms).
Marginal effects are reported
* denotes statistical significance
at the 10% level
** denotes statistical
significance at the 5% level
*** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level
Independent variables Asphalt projects Bridge projects
Number of plan holders −.019*** −.015**
(.004) (.002)
Log of ECE .023* −.011
(.013) (.010)
Log of number of project −.049** −.011
components (.018) (.014)
Log of number of days to −.036** .025**
complete the project (.015) (.013)
Large firm dummy .193** .124**
(.071) (.029)
Difference between firm’s current −.035 −.084**
and average utilization level (.039) (.029)
Log of distance to project −.065*** −.036***
(.011) (.008)
Bidders with ongoing projects .207*** .106**
in the same project county (.021) (.020)
Rival’s average past bidding .035 .135
to plan holder ratio (.097) (.081)
Seasonally unadjusted .035 −.059*
unemployment rate (.033) (.024)
Three month average of −.083 .013
the real volume of projects (.053) (.038)
Three month average of −.226 .173
the number of building
permits
(.138) (.120)
Number of obs. 7,443 9,658
Wald χ2 370.49 443.34
unobserved heterogeneities. We consider here as well the possibility that the standard
errors may be underestimated. We report standard errors clustered by firms.
As for the other RHS variables, the number of bid components, the number of
days to complete a project, and potential for synergies are significant in the sample
of asphalt projects. With respect to the bridge projects, the number of bid compo-
nents, capacity utilization, rival’s past winning to bidding ratio, unemployment rate,
and building permits are significant. We also observe that first-session losers bid more
aggressively in common value auctions on the second day.
Ignoring entry effects, in the second part of Table 4 (columns (5) and (6)), we report
on the estimate of the direct relationship between equilibrium bids (b) and the number
of potential bidders (N ). We run a fixed effects model controlling for unobserved
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Table 4 Regression results for log of bids with firm fixed effects




E[A] from E[A] from E[A] from E[A] from
probit past history probit past history Log(N ) Log(N )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of expected number −.052** −.046** −.023 .002
of bidders E[n] (.019) (.016) (.022) (.017)
Log of number −.050*** −.002
of plan holders (.015) (.016)
Log of ECE .941*** .941*** .890*** .890*** .940*** .890***
(.006) (.006) (.011) (.011) (.006) (.011)
Log of number of .048*** .048*** .143*** .144*** .048*** .144***
project components (.012) (.012) (.017) (.017) (.012) (.017)
Log of number of days .024* .027** .014 .015 .028** .015
to complete the project (.011) (.011) (.009) (.009) (.011) (.009)
Difference between firm’s .020 .019 .037** .038** .017 .038**
current and average utilization (.020) (.020) (.019) (.018) (.020) (.018)
Log of distance to project .015** .016** .010 .010 .016*** .010**
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Bidders with ongoing projects .007 .004 −.005 −.005 .004 −.005
in the same project county (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012)
Bidder with potential .017* .017* −.012 −.013 .017 −.013
synergies (.010) (.010) (.012) (.012) (.010) (.012)
Bidder with no potential −.002 −.001 −.027** −.027** −.001 −.027**
synergies (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010)
Rival’s past winning to −.123 −.100 −.361** −.362** −.154* −.361**
plan holder ratio (.090) (.089) (.145) (.144) (.088) (.146)
Seasonally unadjusted −.008 −.009 −.035** −.033** −.009 −.033**
unemployment rate (.017) (.016) (.015) (.015) (.017) (.015)
Three month average of .012 .016 .004 .003 .014 .004
the real volume of projects (.026) (.025) (.028) (.028) (.025) (.028)
Three month average of the .100 .107 .345*** .345*** .108 .344***
number of building permits (.077) (.076) (.086) (.087) (.077) (.087)
Number of obs. 2,186 2,383 2,186 2,383
Adj. R2 .966 .965 .966 .965
All regressions include a constant term, 11 monthly dummy variables, seven annual dummy variables, and
24 project division dummy variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered by firms)
* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level
** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level
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bidder heterogeneities. We use log of bids as our dependent variable, but use the log
of number of plan holders rather than log of expected number of bidders. The results
suggest that, the competitive effect is significant in asphalt projects. As potential bid-
ders increase, bids become more aggressive. A comparison of the estimated effects
from columns 1, 2 and 5 for asphalt projects and 3, 4 and 6 for bridge work suggest
the lack of significant entry effects across specifications. This was expected in the
common value case according to Lemma 2 but not in the private value case where the
competitive effect seems consistently dominant.
5 Open Questions and Policy Implications
We present the equilibrium to a procurement auction for projects that can have a mix-
ture of private and unknown common cost components. Bidders learn the number of
potential bidders in the auction, as it becomes publicly known which companies hold
plans for the projects. However, as not all plan holders actually bid, bids are prepared
and submitted without bidders knowing the number of rivals that they face. Our focus
is on how the nature of the project—whether largely composed of private cost uncer-
tainty, or common cost uncertainty—affects bidding under numbers uncertainty and
how an increase in the number of potential bidders affects bidding behavior in these
two polar cases.
The theoretical model indicates that in pure private value settings an increase in the
number of plan holders has a direct beneficial effect on bidding, leading to lower costs
to the procuring agency (this is the competition effect). However, as a result of lower
profit margins for the winners of procurement auctions, the incentive to go through
the costly bid preparation process is diminished, which depresses the number of bids
submitted (this is the entry effect). This latter effect can be sufficiently large to offset
the initial beneficial effect of increasing the number of potential bidders—so that it
may possibly be advisable in order to keep the cost of procurement down to restrict
the number of potential bidders.
In the common value setting, due to winner’s curse considerations, the entry effect
itself is ambiguous. As such, the problem of a negative cost impact of increased
potential competition may be more subtle.
Using data from procurement auctions run by the Texas Department of Transporta-
tion, we conduct an empirical investigation of actual bidding behavior in procurement
auctions. As common cost components and private cost components differ system-
atically across the types of projects that are auctioned, we are able to differentiate
between these two paradigms in our empirical estimation. Our analysis reveals that
encouraging potential entry is largely beneficial for the state in auctions with predomi-
nantly private costs (asphalt paving). In auctions that exhibit common cost uncertainty
(bridge repairs) there is no evidence of a significant competitive effect.
Given the theoretical and real concerns about possible adverse effects of increasing
potential competition in procurement auctions, the preliminary empirical investiga-
tions and the theoretical model suggest an urgent need for a better understanding of
the issue along several dimensions: First, a better understanding is needed of how prone
procurement auctions are to such adverse effects—possibly determining systematic
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differences between common and private cost auctions—both in theory, but, more
importantly, also in practice. Second, in instances where increased potential compe-
tition is expected to have adverse effects, studies are needed of how these effects can
best be ameliorated. This raises the issue of restricting entry into procurement auc-
tions. However, the potential benefits of restricting competition must be quantified in
order to be able to contrast them to possible costs, as the practice may be fraught with




Table 5 Regression variables
Independent variable Description and construction of the
independent variable
Log of bids Log value of bids
Relative bid Bid divided by the ECE
Bid dummy variable Bid dummy variable takes the value of one if a plan holder
submits a bid. Else it is equal to zero
Number of bidders The number of bidders in an auction
Log number of bidders The log value of number of bidders
Log of expected number of bidders The expected number of bidders is calculated by summing
the probabilities predicted from the probit model that a
bidder participate for a given auction. Then we take the
log value of the expected number of bidders
Number of plan holders Number of plan holders in an auction
Log number of plan holders Log value of number of plan holders
Log of ECE This is the log value of the ECE
Log number of days to complete
project
Log value of days to complete the project assigned by
TxDOT
Difference between firm’s current
utilization and average utilization
The utilization rate is the current project backlog of a firm
divided by the maximum backlog of that firm during the
sample period. For firms that have never won a contract,
the utilization rate is set to zero. Data from the year 1998
are used to construct a set of initial starting values for the
capacity utilization variable. The 1998:08-1999:12 data is
not used in the empirical models. The backlog variable is
constructed as follows: For each awarded project, TxDOT
pays the monthly work completed amount. A contract
backlog is constructed in each month by summing across
the remaining value of all existing contracts in Texas for a
firm. As projects are completed, the backlog of a firm
goes to zero unless new contracts are won. Then we take
the average capacity rate for firm for the entire sample and
calculate the difference between firm’s current utilization
and average utilization
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Table 5 continued
Independent variable Description and construction of the
independent variable
Distance to the project location The logarithm of the distance to a project is constructed as
the distance between the county the project is located in
and the distance to the firm’s location. The county
location is measured by the longitude and latitude at the
centroid of the ‘county seat’
Average rivals bidding to plan holder
ratio
The measure of rivals’ past average success (ARBP) in
auctions is constructed as the average across rivals of the
ratio of past bids to the past number of plans held. It
captures the probability of a rival’s bidding given that it is
a plan holder
Average rivals winning to plan holder
ratio
The measure of rivals’ past average success (ARWP) in
auctions is constructed as the average across rivals of the
ratio of past wins to the past number of plans held. This
variable incorporates two aspects of past rival bidding
behavior. It incorporates both the probability of a rival’s
bidding given that it is a plan holder and the probability
that the rival wins an auction given that it bid. These
probabilities are updated monthly using the complete set
of bidding data in Texas. The probabilities are initialized
using data from 1998
Closest rival’s distance to the project
location
This variable measures the distance (log of miles) between
the project location and the closest rival
Rivals minimum backlog This variable contains the minimum backlog of the rival
firms in an auction [log(backlog+1)]. See the capacity
utilization variable discussion above for a detailed
explanation of how the backlog variable is constructed
Large firm dummy variable This is a dummy variable that identifies the firm size by the
number of past wins. For asphalt projects the large firm
dummy variable takes the value 1 when a firm has won at




The monthly state-level unemployment rate in Texas from
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Three month average of the real
volume of projects
This variable measures the three-month moving average of
the real volume of all projects in Texas. The real volume
of projects is constructed by adding the ECE across
projects that were up for bid in a month for Texas and
deflating the current value by the PPI. Then we divide it
by the average of the real volume for each state to
calculate the relative real volume
Three-month average of the number
of building permits
This variable measures the three-month moving average of
the relative number of building permits for Texas. The
data come from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis
Log number of bid components This is the total amount of bid items (project components)
in a project described by TxDOT
Bid item shares compared to ECE All bid items are categorized by TxDOT according to Texas
Standard Specification (2004) guide lines. We sum the total
dollar value of these bid components according to these
categories for each auction. Then we calculate the share of
each category as a ratio of ECE. The main categories are
asphalt (surface), bridge (structures), earth work,
maintenance, miscellaneous, subgrade, and traffic work
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Table 5 continued
Independent variable Description and construction of the
independent variable
Monthly dummy variables Monthly dummy variables are a set of 12 variables that
control for the months of the year. The omitted month is
January
Project division dummy variable TXDOT has divided TX into 25 divisions. The project
location dummy variables identify the 25 divisions from
which we draw data for our analysis
Bidders with ongoing projects in
same county
This dummy variable identifies bidders when they are
bidding on projects where they have an ongoing project in
the same county
Bidder with potential synergies This dummy variable identifies a first-session winning
bidder that is bidding in the second session on given
month
Bidder with no potential synergies This dummy variable identifies a first-session losing bidder
that is bidding in the second session on given month
Note: All data come from the Texas Department of Transportation except the state-level unemployment and
building permits data that come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis
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